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CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY

INFORMATION REPORT

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SECURITY INFORMATION

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COUNTRY Indochina

SUBJECT Chinese Communist Aid to the
Democratic Republic of Vietnam

REPORT NO.

DATE DISTR. 21 August 1953

NO. OF PAGES 3

REQUIREMENT NO. RD -

REFERENCES

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1. Supplies received by the Democratic Republic of Vietnam (DRV) from the Chinese Communists are the business of the General Supply Office (Tong-cud Cung-cap) which turns the supplies over to various subordinate units or services. Each of these services, Military Health (Quan Y), Armament (Quan Gio), and the Office of the Commissary (Cuc Quan Nhu), has a permanent delegate at Cao Bang, the principal reception center of Chinese Communist aid, for the purpose of receiving the supplies allotted to it. However, the distribution center for all services is at Cay Ba Mot, at Kilometer 31 on the Thai Nguyen (N 21-35, E 105-50) - Bac Kan (N 22-08, E 105-49) road, the terminal point of the convoys.
2. Since April 1951, distribution of supplies has been made at the regimental level. Prior to this time distribution was made at the divisional level. Distribution is carried out by means of coupons prepared by the Commissary (Quan Nhu) which are distributed to the regiment. The regiment goes directly to Cay Ba Mot to receive the supplies allotted to it. When a regiment is unable to go there because of military operations, the Quan Nhu organizes secret temporary depots to cache the supplies. These depots are not allowed to stand for very long.
3. The principal supplies given by the Chinese Communists are: clothing, mosquito nets, and shoes. These items are furnished in sufficient quantity to supply the needs of the DRV Army, but nothing is reserved for the civilian population.
4. At the beginning of 1951, Chinese Communist aid was in the form of rolls of cloth rather than ready-made clothing and mosquito nets. This led to considerable difficulties in distribution, especially since the fabrication of this material into finished products took too much time in the Commissary workshops. The shops were also subjected to bombing raids. In June 1951, the DRV Commissary sent a group of tailors and workers to Nanning for the preliminary fabrication of clothing. This made the distribution more rapid.

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5. The only rice given to the DRV by the Chinese Communists was two wagon loads sent from Kwang Tsi in May 1951. This shipment of rice was mixed with local rice and distributed to all services and units of the army for propaganda purposes. Arms and medicine are distributed in the same manner.
6. The frequency of supply convoys from Communist China to the DRV is irregular but usually averages one convoy per month. The principal route is from Kwang Tsi to Cao Bang (N 22-41, E 106-18) by way of Loung Tcheou and Lang Son (N 21-50, E 106-45). The other routes are secondary. All routes converge on Cao Bang, except for certain unusual cases. Each convoy is composed of from fifteen to fifty trucks.
7. Before the institution of the agricultural tax in 1951, the supplying of paddy to the army was the responsibility of the General Supply Office which directed the Interzone, Provincial, and District echelons to buy paddy from the population for the use of the troops.
8. At this time, each military unit had its own autonomous commissary service, independent of the Cuc Quan Nhu, which was a civil organization attached to the Ministry of National Defense. There was a great deal of confusion under this system. Supplies were not sufficient in certain places while in others whole depots of paddy deteriorated before it could be used. When the Chief of the General Supply Office was executed in November 1950, one of the principal accusations was that he had sabotaged the supply program.
9. An attempt to decrease the disorder was made at the end of 1950 by the creation of Committees of Supply (Ban Tiep Luong) to be attached to the Delegation of the Administrative Committee (U.B.H.C.K.C.) at the district level. This Committee was centralized at the national level under the direction of Le Van Hien, Minister of Finances, with representatives of the Quan Nhu and the Ministry of Economy assisting. Activities on the local level were directed by the U.B.H.C.K.C. and the delegation of the Lao Dong Party.
10. Another attempt to settle the confusion was made in the beginning of 1951, by the centralization of both civil and military supply services under the direction of the General Commissary. In February 1952, all personnel were militarized to facilitate command. Nguyen Thanh Binh was made a general officer and chiefs of services were made colonels.
11. At the present time, paddy is collected as taxes in kind on agricultural items in each village and entrusted to a committee for the Conservation of Paddy. This committee is part of the Committee of Supply. On the national level paddy is managed by the Ban Tiep Luong under the direction of Le Van Hien. The Ban Tiep Luong assigns the allotment of paddy to the Commissary.
12. The Commissary apportions paddy to the various units of the regular army by means of coupons which can be exchanged for one or two kilograms of rice. The coupons are said to be worth one or two kilograms of rice. The rice which is distributed by the Commissary is prepared for distribution by the committees of the villages.
13. The supplying of regional troops is the responsibility of the region to which the troops are assigned, except when they are engaged in military operations outside their own territory.
14. The system of coupons is common to all services. For example, Can Bo when out on a mission receive coupons to cover their travel expenses. The uniform payment is two kilograms of rice each day.
15. The Tong Cuc Cung Cap plays a principal role in the supplying of material to the Army including troops, armament, transport, and medical supplies. The General Political Office (Tong Cuc Chinh Tu) controls the ideology of the Army through its political commissars. The only things left to General Vo Nguyen Giap are strategy and the conduct of operations.

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16. When Nguyen Thanh Binh was raised to the rank of general and the chiefs of services were made colonel, Vo Nguyen Giap objected on the grounds that it was unjust to officers of combat units. However, Giap's objection was overruled.

- 25X1A 1. ☐ Comment. According to a previous report, the U.B.H.C.K.C. was a subordinate unit of the Committees of Supply.

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